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Abstract The “special state” understanding of the measurement process is presented,
namely there is no “measurement process,” only unitary time evolution. However, in
contrast to the many worlds interpretation, there is only one world. How this can be
accomplished and how statistical mechanics is changed as a result are also discussed.
The focus though is on experimental tests of this theory and the in-principle realization
that this can give rise to feasible experimental tests. Those tests rely on the particular
feature of having only one world, so that any change in the wave function must have
a proximate cause, and it is the detection of that cause that constitutes the test. In
a companion article there is further exploration concerning the details of the test. In
addition, in the present article, the special state theory is extended theoretically through
evidence of the uniqueness of the Cauchy distribution as well as explicit recognition
of the role of entanglement.
Keywords Special states · Arrow of time · Foundational experiments
1 Introduction
Many interpretations of quantum mechanics exist, all of which agree on experimental
results. This is why they are called interpretations. Other understandings of the mea-
surement process may differ and sometimes offer the possibility of an experimental
check. In this article I describe a theory that differs in its experimental predictions from
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all others that I know of. Like the Many Worlds Interpretation it allows only unitary
time evolution, but unlike that theory, has only one world. This suffices to create an
experimental test.
The experimental prediction to which I refer is the absence of source free changes
in angular momentum. Thus in either the many worlds interpretation (MWI) or
the Copenhagen interpretation (in which I include the variety of ensemble theo-
ries) it is permitted for a spin prepared (say) in an eigenstate of Jx to be measured
in an eigenstate of Jz . Your idea of which way the angular momentum vector is
pointing has changed, but there is no need for any force to have been applied (I
go into this in detail below). For the special state theory, there must be a force
applied to the spin to reorient it. Observing or not observing that force is the
test.
In Sect. 2 I discuss quantum aspects, how it is possible to have only pure uni-
tary (time) evolution and nevertheless have but a single “world.” Following that,
Sect. 3 deals with related issues of statistical mechanics. This is relevant, since it
is clear that to have both pure unitary evolution and only one world something
wildly un-intuitive must be happening. This strangeness will be seen to be in the
realm of statistical mechanics. Some of these topics are taken up at greater length
in [1].
Finally in Sect. 5 I show that for the special state theory the changes in direction of
one’s perception of angular momentum require forces, while for the MWI (etc.), they
do not. Sect. 6 is a discussion.
The appendices are mainly concerned with technical matters. Of note is Appendix
2, where I present strong evidence for the appearance of the Cauchy distribution in the
theory. (See Sect. 4 for the significance of this distribution.) The material in Appendix
2 represents an important step beyond what appears in [1]. In that reference I found
that the Cauchy distribution provided a solution, but there was no proof that the second
moment needed to be infinite. In the new work the drop-off of the Cauchy distribution
stands out as superior to other options including other long-tailed distributions that
lack a second moment.
2 Quantum Aspects
According to the special state theory, the only thing that ever happens is pure unitary
quantum time evolution. If one has a wave function ψ at time-0, and if H is its Hamil-
tonian, then at time-t the wave function is exp(−i Ht/h¯)ψ . “Measurement” involves
no other dynamics. So far this sounds like the many-worlds interpretation. But I inject
another feature: there is only one world. How can this be? Let us look at a very small
world. Suppose there is a single 2-state system in contact with a heat bath of bosons
[2]. Initially the system is in its excited state and the bosons serve two purposes: their
coupling induces the decay and they constitute the measurement device that notes the
decay. This model of decay andmeasurement misses much of the real world, like “reg-
istering” the measurement, i.e., making sure the system does not return to its excited
state (irreversibility). These features are assumed to result from parts of the system
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that I do not model. I use the spin boson model with a single boson, for which I can
take the Hamiltonian1 to be
H = ε
2
(1 + σz) + ωa†a + βσx (a† + a). (1)
The Pauli spin matrices are the operators for the 2-state (spin) system, a and a† are
the boson operators and ε, β and ω are parameters.





, with the oscillator state
unspecified. For the parameters given in footnote 2, at time-0.15 there is about a 50%
probability of decay, namely if onewould trace out over the oscillator states the density
matrix for the spinwould be half-half. However, there are two states that I wish to focus
on. These are particular initial states of the oscillator, and their probability distributions
are given in Fig. 1. The state whose probability distribution is shown in Fig. 1a (and
whose phases are also fixed, but not shown) has the property that at time-0.15 it has not
decayed at all, despite the fact that a random or average state would, at that time, be in
a superposition of up and down spin states, with about half its probability in each state.
Similarly, the state whose probabilities are shown in Fig. 1b has decayed (almost)3
completely at this time, again despite the behavior of a typical or average state.
This does not mean that the non-decay state must never change its spin-occupation
values and certainly the decay state had to change, since at time-0 it had no amplitude
in the decayed state. For reference, the probability that each of these states is in the
“up” state is shown as a function of time in Fig. 2. As is clear, the decay or non-decay
criterion is only applied at time-0.15. At other times the states can be anything.
What good are these states and how did I find them? The second question is
addressed in Appendix 1 and is technical. The answer to the first question is the
main idea for avoiding many worlds while holding on to unitary time evolution.
Suppose our Schrödinger cat is placed in a chamber with the usual vial of poison
whose dispersal is governed by the spin state of a spin-boson system of the sort just
discussed. The latter system is also in the chamber and the entire setup isolated. It is
opened—its isolation ceases and the irreversible “registration” is due to the observer—
at time-0.15 and one looks to see if the cat is dead or alive. The usual problem is that
there is positive probability for both options. However, there is no problem if the ini-
tial state of the oscillator is one of the “special” ones I have been describing. For the
non-decay state there is a living cat, for the decay state it is dead. This is accomplished
1 The full spin boson model is generally taken to have Hamiltonian H = (ε/2)(1 + σz) + σx +∑
k ωka
†








k /ωk , but we will take a much simpler version for our example,
as given in Eq. (1).
2 The parameters for the spin boson model of Eq. (1) are  = 0.5, ω = 0.1, and β = 0.6. The oscillator
was cut off and altogether 250 states were considered. This led to an error in the commutator of a and a†
in the 250th diagonal term, but not elsewhere. To reduce the cut off effect, only states with relatively small
probability in the highest levels were considered.
3 Neither the non-decay nor the decay is perfect. For the case shown, the probability of decay for the
“non-decay” state is about 6.1 × 10−4, while the probability of non-decay of the “decay” state is about
8.1 × 10−5. I comment on this near the end of Sect. 3.
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Fig. 1 a shows the probability of excitation of various oscillator states that contribute to the non-decay
state. Only shown are even oscillator states, as the total amplitude in this case for the odd states is computed
to be about 10−27 and is due to numerical error.4 Phases of the states are not shown, but are also fixed by
the non-decay condition. In image (b) are shown the probabilities for the state that decays; in this case only
even oscillator states are shown (again the wrong parity states are due to numerical error). As in image
(a), the phases, though not shown are crucial to the “special” nature of the state. Both images represent
the probabilities at time-0. Note that although in this case both special states only involve even states, in
general special states can be of either parity. [On the other hand, for other Hamiltonians or projections, the
special states need not be eigenstates of H (see footnote 4)].
Fig. 2 Survival history of the non-decay and decay states, where “survival” is the probability that the
system is in the “up” state at the indicated time (horizontal axis). Image (a) shows this probability for the
non-decay state, which for this example was a “non-decay” state at all intermediate times, but in general
need not be. Similarly, image (b) shows the corresponding probability for the state found to be (essentially)
fully decayed at time-0.15. At both earlier and later times it need not be fully decayed.
with no black magic; it is the result of unitary time evolution from the specified initial
conditions.
That is the main idea of the special state theory: no macroscopic superpositions
because the initial conditions are special—always.5 I mention also that there is no
4 For the Hamiltonian of Eq. (1) there is a constant of the motion, conventionally called “parity.” For
the single oscillator this is parity≡ 	 = (−1)a†aσz , and [H,	] = 0. (See Appendix 1 for notation in
the following discussion.) Our “B” also commutes with 	 because the projections involved (P and Q)
themselves commute with 	, since they are functions of the operator σz . Hence the eigenstates of B also
can be sorted by their parity. In general, if the projections do not cummute with particular symmetries of
the Hamiltonian there would be no need for B and H to have common spectrum.
5 Note also that this enforces a degree of determinism that may elicit extreme discomfort. For example,
my special state for the spin-boson system put into the cat’s chamber is special for time 0.15, not for
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entanglement. At time-0.15 the spin state is wholly in one state or the other and a trace
over its coordinates would leave the oscillator state unchanged; and vice-versa.
The next—obvious—question is, why should Nature arrange to have a “special”
state as the initial conditions for every situation where a potential split into many
worlds occurs? For this I do not have an answer, except to say that it is the conclusion
I am driven to by insisting that no magic dynamics occurs in the measurement process
and there is only oneworld.What I can offer though is perspective. How strange is it for
there to be particular, non-random, initial conditions? For this I turn to the next Section.
3 Boundary Conditions and the Arrow of Time
When making predictions I assume the initial conditions are random. As discussed in
[1] this is equivalent to the usual arrow of time. But this assumption has never been
verified experimentally; its main virtue is that answers computed with this assumption
agree with experiment—no mean feat, but not a definitive proof, as I will shortly
demonstrate.
This assumption is closely related to another that occurs in statistical mechanics,
the ergodic hypothesis. As discussed in [3] this lies at the foundations of statistical
mechanics but has never been established6 and is very likely false. Textbook authors
(as described in [3]) have struggled with this problem in arguments leading to the
justification, for example, of adopting the thermal state (ρ ∼ exp(−βH)). But the
hypothesis is generally accepted for the reason mentioned earlier: agreement with
experience—so far.
To show that the assumption of random initial conditions is unnecessary, I use the
cat map [4], which is known to be mixing (and thus ergodic). This is a map of the unit
square (with coordinates x, y) into itself
x ′ ≡ x + y















Our system is an ideal gas consisting of N points in the unit square, each moving in
discrete time under the cat map. For example, in Fig. 3 I show what happens with a
collection of N = 500 points initially satisfying 0.5 ≤ x ≤ 0.6 and 0.5 ≤ y ≤ 0.6.
Clearly this mechanical system is headed for chaos. To get a quantitative idea of
“chaos” I define an information entropy using a coarse graining. As grains I take the
Footnote 5 continued
another time. It is coordinated with the fact that the observer actually opens the chamber at that time. This
observer may think the opening time is arbitrary, but it is already built into the state of the universe that the
chamber will be opened at that time. For some interpretations of the concept of free will this would deny
that possibility (but there are many interpretations). This level of predictability and determinism is natural
with the two-time boundary conditions that are introduced in the next section, but for some, the conclusions
may be shocking.
6 Proofs of ergodicity in the realm of mathematics of course do exist, but they are of little relevance for the
uses to which physicists put this hypothesis. The dynamics used in those demonstrations is artificial and
even more important, the time scales for true multiparticle systems are enormous, well beyond the lifetime
of the universe.
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Fig. 3 500 points are started in the square 0.5 ≤ x ≤ 0.6 and 0.5 ≤ y ≤ 0.6, but are otherwise randomly
selected. After one time step under the cat map, Eq. (2), they have become the parallelogram in the next
figure. They have stretched in the direction of the eigenvector with larger eigenvalue of M (Eq. (2)) and
correspondingly shrunk along the other eigenvector. The product of the eigenvalues is 1 because det M = 1.
The dynamics thus satisfies Liouville’s theorem, in which area is preserved in phase space. By time 3 (the
next figure) the mod 1 action coupled with the stretching has begun to pull the points apart and by time 7
(the last figure) nothing is recognizable.
Fig. 4 Entropy, as defined in
Eq. (3), as a function of time for
the simulation of Fig. 3. Note
that equilibration sets in at about
time-5. The dashed figure is the
maximum entropy for this
coarse graining, namely log 100.
It is not attained because of
fluctuations due to the finite
number of points.
100 1/10 by 1/10 squares contained in the unit square, and only count the number of
points in each grain. In effect I assume the observer can only determine which square
a point is in, not the point’s exact coordinates. With this coarse graining the entropy is
S = −
∑
pk log pk , pk ≡ nk/N , (3)
where k runs over the coarse grains and nk is the number of points in grain-k. The
behavior of the entropy for the points in Fig. 3 is shown in Fig. 4
This is what one might call normal behavior: the initial points were selected ran-
domly within the given grain and the entropy increases monotonically until close to
equilibrium, after which it fluctuates in a predictable way.7 But let me display another
simulation. As I will explain in a moment, the initial points were not selected ran-
domly, but for the first time steps it certainly will look that way. The simulation runs
7 Finding the average deviation from maximum entropy is straightforward for given parameters (number
of grains, number of points), although the calculation involves non-uniform asymptotics. See [1], p. 40 and
Exercise 2.2.2 (but beware of typos).
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Fig. 5 The times are as follows: row-1: [0, 1, 2, 4]; row-2: [6, 7, 8, 9]; row-3: [10, 11, 12, 14]; row-4: [15,
16, 17, 18]. These points all evolve under the cat map and satisfy boundary conditions at times 0, 9 and 18.
Size of the point position marker varies with the image, for better visibility.
for 18 times steps away from the initial square and is shown in Fig. 5. The sequence of
images should be read left-to-right and row-by-row. There are 4000 points and most
time steps are illustrated. I stress, every single point in this simulation evolved by pure
cat map dynamics. So how did I get it to give me these strange images? Actually it was
easy. I randomly occupied the first little square (0.6 ≤ x ≤ 0.8 and 0.4 ≤ y ≤ 0.6)
at time-0 with about 30×4000 points. Then I imposed two conditions on the points.
First, at time-18 they needed to occupy a different little square (but of the same size
as the original). This cut the number of acceptable points by a factor 25. Then I also
required that at time-9 the points arranged themselves in the figure of a cat. This cut
things down a bit more, so I was left with 4000 points that satisfied all three conditions.
This solved a 3-time boundary value problem. It was trivial in this case since the points
were non-interacting; simply removing a point did not affect the others. It should be
pointed out that solving a multiple time boundary value problem for interacting par-
ticles, even two of them, can be quite challenging. But for the point I wish to make,
an ideal gas does the job.
123
1478 Found Phys (2016) 46:1471–1494
Fig. 6 The circles and solid line
represent the entropy as a
function of time for the
simulation shown in Fig. 5. Note
that it drops a bit at time-9 and
then at time-18 plummets back
to 0, since all points are again in
a single grain. The other curve,
marked by stars, is the entropy
as a function of time for 4000
points having the same initial
condition, but with no other
constraints.
To get a message from this demonstration I turn to entropy. The coarse graining is a
bit more coarse than before: grain sizes are 1/5 by 1/5. For each of the configurations
shown the entropy was computed and is graphed as the circles in Fig. 6. A second
curve, with star markers, is also shown in that figure. It is the entropy for 4000 points
initially starting in the same coarse grain, but having no additional requirements. (Like
Fig. 4, it corresponds to “normal” initial conditions.) Compare these two curves. The
point I wish to make is that for times prior to about 7 you cannot tell the difference.
The entropy graph makes the point quantitatively, but qualitatively, if you compare
Figs. 3 and 5, it is clear that aside from slightly different initial conditions, there is a
great similarity in the initial relaxation. One can be quantitative in other ways also,
discussing relaxation times and such, but the issue to be stressed is that with fewer
than 4% of available points the relaxation, almost to the time of the constraint, looks
entirely normal.
Mymessage is simple: I may have future constraints, but I would not know about it.
The arrow of time does not (necessarily) point as fixedly as one might have supposed.
Another way to say this is to observe that the points in the simulation that yielded
Fig. 5were not randombut had a cryptic constraint, that is a constraint that was difficult
(or for the macroscopic world, impossible) to discern, but which nevertheless plays in
important role as the dynamics unfolds.
My objective in this presentation is to pave the way for the idea that there could be
other cryptic constraints in the world. In particular, not every imaginable state occurs
in Nature; only those which, in my terminology, are special. This is surely a severe
restriction, but I have made the point that the restriction may be invisible. The kind
of restriction that I find most palatable is a two-time boundary condition. This surely
contradicts the usual arrow of time, but as demonstrated, its effect may not be noticed
except close to the boundaries, which may be well-separated.8
8 ThomasGold introduced the idea that the thermodynamic arrow of time is a consequence of the expanding
universe [8]. Some reviled this idea claiming the absurdity of an opposite arrow if our universe has a big
crunch in its future. Even some respected scientists failed to appreciate how a two-time boundary value
problem deals with this issue. See also [12].
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What kind of two-timeboundary condition could select special states? First consider
initial conditions. As Wald [5] has pointed out, in the early universe the entropy was
low, for unknown reasons. I will go a step further: perhaps the von Neumann entropy
was also low, in other words there was little or no entanglement. In this speculative
mode I will further imagine that our entire cosmology is roughly time symmetric.
This idea is not popular today due to the discovery of accelerating expansion. But
the phenomenon is poorly understood and there have been suggestions of a periodic
cosmology despite the acceleration (a far from comprehensive sample is [6,7]), so
I will take liberties in my speculation. One additional component enters this line of
thought, namely the connection first suggested by Gold [8], relating the arrow of time
to an expanding universe. One then expects that under contraction the arrow will
be reversed. Recalling the connection between boundary conditions and the arrow of
time, one can now enunciate a possible boundary condition that would demand special
states: no entanglement at the beginning, no entanglement at the end.9
Consider then a Schrödinger cat. At the end of the experiment—and again demand-
ing only unitary time evolution—in the MWI there is a portion of the wave function
with a dead cat and portion of the wave function having support on a macroscopic state
recognized as a living cat. The dead one is buried, the living one perhaps becomes
involved in another experiment, sending cats to Mars. But how can these portions
of wave function be recombined coherently, as they would need to be if there is a
no-entanglement demand in our future. It would take tremendous coordination to
accomplish this coherently. Having a special state is also an unlikely way to avoid
entanglement, but it is much less unlikely than recombining after a superposition of
macroscopically distinct states has formed.
There are many caveats in the above argument. The first is that maybe the need
for special states has nothing to do with cosmology. It may be that special states are
indeed the way to reconcile quantum and statistical mechanics, but the argument just
given is wrong or irrelevant. Next, it is possible that future boundary conditions might
obtain even in an ever-expanding universe. Then there are technical matters. What is
the role of identical particles? Perhaps you do not need to recombine the cat, since its
electrons and other constituents are all identical, you may be able to recombine local
portions of the wave function with particles nearby. For these and other questions, the
short answer is, I don’t know.
But with the two-time boundary rationale one can approach another issue, namely
what about the small amount of left over wave function. As I state in footnote 3,
the special state for decay has a small but non-zero probability of non-decay (in the
example given it is 8.1×10−5), similarly for the non-decay special state. In the context
of a boundary value problem one does not need perfection. The measure of possible
error in “specializing” is given by the tolerance of that boundary value problem.
There are several comments to be made that reflect on the plausibility of these
ideas. First there are the numbers. In my computer modeling I found errors of order
8.1× 10−5 using a Hilbert space of dimension 500. The actual dimension of physical
9 Of course there is entanglement every time a bound state forms. The assumption is that this is also
accomplished bymeans of special states. The electron and proton (say) definitely come together or definitely
do not. As usual this can only be accomplished with the aid of other degrees of freedom.
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spaces boggles the imagination. Using known formulas for entropy, one mole of neon
in 1 cubic meter at room temperature and pressure possesses [3] on the order of
M = exp(S/kB)  101.3× 1025 states, i.e., dimensions in Hilbert space. So for any
macroscopic apparatus one can expect far smaller errors than I obtained inmy example.
In a similar vein, reflecting on the total number of states in the universe, it becomes less
implausible that only a tiny subset (the special states) can nevertheless contain many
states.10 Another point, which may be surprising, is that for the right kind of wave
functions, there is a cessation of entanglement in their collisions [9]. If you scatter
particles of unequal mass having Gaussian wave packets off one another they rapidly
adjust the packet width so that there is no further entanglement.
Finally there is the issue of recovering the Born probabilities. If every experiment
involves interaction with apparatus and special states, why is it that probabilities can
be calculated using only the wave function of the system being studied? This is our
next subject.
4 Recovering Standard Probabilities
A fair coin has a 50% chance of landing heads, 50% tails. In effect, the phase space
of your body and the motions needed to flip the coin are divided into two sets, one
of which gives heads, one tails. These should be closely interwoven so that you have
difficulty controlling the outcome. So is this a property of the coin or of you?
Something along these lines is what I claim occurs during a quantummeasurement.
The Born rule says, look only at the wave function. But I am saying that the space of
special states of the apparatus breaks up in the way the phase space of the coin flipper
does. The special states are a small subset (subspace, actually) of the entire Hilbert
space, but their relative size (dimension) is proportional to the probabilities of the
various outcomes. In other words, quantum probability is like its classical counterpart:
in each instance the result is determined, but one would need microscopic precision to
know the outcome. So one uses probability. The claim therefore is that the dimension
of the space of special states for each outcome is proportional to the square of the
wave function amplitude for that outcome.
This is an assertion that I do not know how to check. The few cases where I have an
analytic handle on special states (see [1]) I do not consider typical, and where I have
10 The ideas of determinism (see foonote 5) and two-time boundary conditions can have implications
outside of the quantum issues we have devoted this article to. As is well-known, the evidence for the
existence of black holes, while convincing (e.g., [13]), does not exclude the possibility that there are
compact objects, highly dense, but that they simply have not passed to the black hole stage. Why not? No
reason has been given and it would seem to be highly contrived to assume that peculiar dynamical features
have just managed to prevent black hole formation under accepted notions of general relativity. However,
once you have black holes in the universe other problems arise, information issues and firewalls [14]. Given
the speculative nature of the boundary conditions I have proposed (“no entanglement at the beginning, no
entanglement at the end”) one can continue the speculation and demand that the boundary conditions also
require that no black holes form, despite their dynamical possibility (just as I am claiming that macroscopic
superpositions—Schrödinger cats—do not form, despite their dynamical possibility). This may also have
bearing on the question that Wald [5] poses: why did the universe not begin in a maximum entropy state,
i.e., a black hole? On the other hand, my proposal can be viewed simply as a rephrasing of his question:
why have these boundary conditions? It is questions like these that suggest humility for homo sapiens.
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numerical results I believe the spaces are much too small. As a result, I have taken a
defensive position on this point, to see if the assertion can be disproved.
I focus on the simplest quantum measurement problem, determining the state of a








There are of course many other degrees of freedom in this problem. Foremost is
the position of the spin (riding perhaps on a K atom); then there is the macroscopic
magnet, macroscopic screen, and much, much more. Consistent with the desire to
show impossibility I grant that there are special states to do the job, different ones
for different angles, θ , of the spin orientation. I can make a guess at the nature of the
special state—if it exists—by looking for the least unlikely way to get the usual Stern-
Gerlach result. The special state might unite the spatial wave function of the K with
diverging position coordinates after it has emerged from the inhomogeneous magnetic
field. This seems to me less likely—involving more degrees of freedom doing atypical
things—than to have θ turned to 0 or π before it enters the field.11 So we’ll assume
that’s what happens; perhaps what one takes to be a stray magnetic field provides just
the right force to bring the spin to 0 or π prior to its entry into the inhomogeneous
field, the function of that field being to make the position coordinate dependent on the
original spin.
Let us call this apparently (but not really) random change in θ a “kick.” As θ varies,
the number of kicks to one or the other special value also varies. Let f (θ) be the
probability of obtaining a kick of size θ . Of course for any one experiment only kicks
of size−θ +nπ (with n an integer) enter, but it is reasonable to assume that as θ varies
there is some well-defined distribution, manifested in our situation as a probability.
Thus to get spin up one must have a kick of size −θ or, if one allows for larger kicks,
2nπ−θ . Similarly, to get spin down one requires a kick of size (2n+1)π−θ (with n an
integer). Thus the probability of spin up is g(θ) = ∑n=∞n=−∞ f (−θ + 2nπ). Similarly
for spin down one adds π to each summand in the argument of f . On the other hand,
standard quantum mechanics, i.e., the Born rules, dictate that the ratio of down to up






= g(θ + π)
g(θ)
, with g(θ) ≡
n=∞∑
n=−∞
f (θ + 2nπ). (5)
(In Eq. (5), in the definition of g, use has been made of f ’s θ → −θ symmetry as well
as the fact that n is a dummy variable.) There is an explicit solution to Eq. (5), namely
f0(θ) = 1/θ2. Unfortunately this solution is not normalizable, as a probability should
be. (In fact there is no normalizable solution to Eq. (5); see App. 2.) However, for θ
close to 0 it is possible to cut off the function and eliminate the singularity without
experimental implications. A convenient cutoff makes use of the Cauchy distribution
11 In the companion article [10] we discuss this issue more thoroughly.
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Ca(φ) = a/π
a2 + φ2 , (6)
which for small enough a changes Eq. (5) very little (see App. 3). The deviations
from standard probabilities are largest for θ ∼ 0 and are of order a2; since a is
unknown, one does not have an experimental test. The distribution Ca does not have a
secondmoment (it is a Lévy distribution), and thismay be necessary for any function f
satisfyingEq. (5). InApp. 2 I report partial proofs, but I emphasize that for the purposes
of the experimental tests described below and in [10], the Cauchy distribution is not
required.
Before going to what I consider a true experimental test I will discuss two possi-
bilities, one of which does not constitute a test, while the other may, but I don’t know
how to estimate outcomes.
Thefirst—the non-test—dealswith fluctuations. Perhapswith aCauchy distribution
at the heart of the special states, fluctuations would be exceptionally large. In other
words, you send in N atomswith initial wave function given by Eq. (4) and the average
number of spin down outcomes would be N sin2(θ/2); nevertheless, the fluctuations
about that average would be larger than the expected
√
N . For better or for worse, this
is not true, and a mathematical demonstration is given in App. 4.
A second test deals with runs, i.e., are the successive (in time) spin values, as
detected by the (Stern-Gerlach) screen independent of one another, or do they tend
to have many up, followed by many down, etc., keeping the average correct. Why
should this be? If the special state depends on fluctuations in the magnetic fields, it is
plausible that fewer unusual field values would be needed if successive “kicks” were
correlated. This may indeed be happening, but I have no way to estimate it.
5 Force-Free Rotation?
In the MWI there is no need for any force to be applied in order to go from (say) an
eigenfunction of Jx to an eigenfunction of Jz . The same is true for the Copenhagen
interpretation.
What is amusing is that individual observers do have a change in their perceptions
of the value of the angular momentum, and this occurs because of a change in the
overall wave function, but there is no need for angular momentum non-conservation.
The context is the Stern-Gerlach experiment measuring the z component of angular
momentum. Imagine an (already) up spin sent into this apparatus. There is no transfer of
Jz , although there is a very small transfer of linearmomentum, since the atom (carrying
the spin) is deflected. Similarly a down spin induces no Jz transfer. In equations
|ψ〉+ = |↑〉 ⊗ 0 ⊗ |observer〉 → U |ψ〉+ = |↑〉 ⊗ + ⊗ |observer sees +〉
|ψ〉− = |↓〉 ⊗ 0 ⊗ |observer〉 → U |ψ〉− = |↓〉 ⊗ − ⊗ |observer sees −〉. (7)
In these equationsU = exp(−i Ht/h¯) is the time evolution operator and  represents
anything not the spin or the observer, in particular the magnets and the atom’s trans-
lational degrees of freedom. I emphasize: although there is a small transfer of linear
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momentum, there no transfer of z-component of angular momentum in either case.
But now consider an initial state whose spin is not oriented along the z-axis,
ψinitial = (α|↑〉 + β|↓〉) ⊗ 0 ⊗ |observer〉. (8)
By the superposition principle this yields one observer who had prepared the state at
a non-trivial angle to the z-axis, but found at the end a spin pointing along that axis.
The same is true of the other observer. Each has seen a change in the perception of
the z-component of angular momentum. On the other hand, since the wave function
in Eq. (8) is a superposition of the initial wave functions of Eq. (7) the dynamics can
be separately considered for each, and there is no transfer of z-component of angular
momentum at any stage. How can this be? The (version of the) observer who saw “up”
will say, “Oh, I was on the “α” (in our notation) component of the wave function, while
the other (version of the) observer would make a similar statement, with β replacing α.
One should not find this shocking. Despite the observer’s possible perplexity, there
is conservationof angularmomentum.The totalHamiltonian commuteswith the (total)
Jz operator; it’s just that each observer, decohered from the other, sees a peculiarity.
The explanation would be slightly different for (my understanding of) the Copen-
hagen interpretation. Until you actually measure Jz it has no value, since Jz does not
commute with the projector for the spin state in Eq. (8).
However, with only one world—the contention of the special state theory—there
can be no change in the wave function without a proximate cause. If a quantity is
changed the single observer can, if it is physically possible, determine what caused
the change. This proximate cause lies in the special state itself. If 〈|Jz |〉 (of the spin)
changes its value, something else has to pick it up.12 This “something” can only be
due to the peculiarities of the special state, what has been called a kick earlier. (Recall,
the kick is not a deviation from the laws of nature, but like the cat at time-9 in the
progression of Fig. 5, it is the result of exact obedience to the rules, but happening
because of unusual initial conditions.)13
In a companion article [10]we give concrete suggestions for detecting the ostensibly
random cause in some partulcar experiments. The general idea is to find where the
unusual state (giving rise to the “kick”) is least unlikely, and attempting to detect it.
6 Discussion
After giving background on the special state theory I arrived at a potential experimental
test. The many worlds and Copenhagen interpretations predict observations of source-
free changes of the observer’s perception of the angular momentum. The special state
theory, on the other hand, does not: somethingmust push the spin to its neworientation.
The proposed experimental test makes use of this distinction.
12 The fact that [H, Jz ] = 0 guarantees that the expectation of the operator does not change. In MWI
this allows the two versions of the observer to balance 〈|Jz |〉, but this is not possible in the special state
theory—there is only one observer at the end of the experiment.
13 I mention here initial conditions, but the conditions could be specified at any time, since the dynamics,
both for the cat and for quantum mechanics, are completely deterministic.
123
1484 Found Phys (2016) 46:1471–1494
In the appendices special topics related to the main text are taken up. In particu-
lar there is a proof that no probability distribution can exactly satisfy Eq. (5) and a
demonstration of the preferred role of the Cauchy distribution—preferred even over
other long-tailed distributions.
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Appendix 1: One Way to Find Special States
For the purposes of the present article, I define “special” to mean the system is initially
in some subspace of Hilbert space (H) at time-0 and in a second subspace (possibly the
same one) at a particular later time, T . In the spin-boson example of Sect. 2 the initial
subspace was {spin up} ⊗ {all oscillator states}. Let the projector for this subspace
be called P . Let the final subspace have projector Q. For our spin-boson example,
Q = P or Q = projection operator for {spin down} ⊗ {all oscillator states}, which is
why it was appropriate to call the quantity in Fig. 2 the survival probability, survival
in the subspace PH. If the initial state ψ ∈ PH, letting U (t) ≡ exp (−i Ht/h¯), then
the amplitude in QH at time-t is Aψ , with A ≡ QU (t)P . The probability of going
from one subspace to the other is thus 〈ψ |A†Aψ〉, so that to say that a vector leaves
one entirely in PH at time-t is to say that B ≡ A†A has an eigenvalue 1. Finding the
spin to be entirely down would mean that the overall state vector is in the subspace
QH with Q = projection operator for {spin down} ⊗ {all oscillator states}, which is
to say, the operator B has an eigenvalue 0. The search for special states thus takes the
form of studying the spectrum of the operator B. This is what is done with respect to
the model given in Eq. (1).







= g(θ + π)
g(θ)
, with g(θ) ≡
n=∞∑
n=−∞
f (θ + 2nπ). (9)
where f (θ) is a probability distribution, symmetric about 0 andmonotonically decreas-
ing as |θ | increases.As remarked, f0(θ) = 1/θ2 solves Eq. (9), but is not integrable and
therefore cannot be a probability distribution. I first show that there is no continuous
integrable solution.
Suppose the contrary. Define h(θ) ≡ g(θ) sin2(θ/2). By Eq. (9) h has period
π . Now f (0) must be (strictly) positive and therefore g is as well. Moreover, g is
integrable on [−π, π ] since f is integrable on [−∞,∞]. This implies that h(0) = 0,
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since otherwise g would not be integrable. By the periodicity of h, I must also have
that h(π) = 0.14 But sin2(π/2) = 1, implying that g(π) = 0, which in turn implies
that f (π) = 0 since f is non-negative. By monotonicity this implies that the entire
support of f is on [−π, π ] and f = g. Let θ = π + φ > π . Then by the periodicity
of h, h(θ) = h(φ) = f (π + φ) sin2(π + φ) = 0 × a positive constant = 0, so h
vanishes everywhere, which is impossible.
So the best that can be done is to solve the functional equation approximately. One
can write
Pr(UP) = cos2(θ/2) − s(θ)
Pr(DN) = sin2(θ/2) + s(θ) , (10)
with the assumption that |s(θ)|  1. This form is dictated by the demand that the
probabilities add to 1. It is physically clear that s(θ) is real and symmetric about θ = 0.
Moreover, non-negativity of the probabilities demands that
Pr(UP) ≥ 0 ⇒ cos2(θ/2) ≥ s(θ), Pr(DN) ≥ 0 ⇒ sin2(θ/2) ≥ −s(θ), (11)









(Note that for small s the ratio becomes tan2(θ/2) + s(θ)/ cos4(θ/2).) I again define
h(θ) = g(θ) sin2(θ/2) (13)
and Eq. (12) becomes
h(θ + π) − h(θ) = s(θ) (g(θ + π) + g(θ)) . (14)
Dividing, I obtain an expression for the correction term, s(θ). It is then clear that it
automatically satisfies the inequalities of Eq. (11). In particular it follows that
cos2(θ/2) − s(θ) = g(θ)
g(θ) + g(θ + π) and
s(θ) + sin2(θ/2) = g(θ + π)
g(θ) + g(θ + π), (15)










14 It is also true that the symmetry of h about 0 (following from that of g) implies that for small θ ,
h(θ) = O(θ2), but we will not use this.
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and the Poisson summation formula
∞∑
k=−∞
F(x + 2πk) =
∞∑
n=−∞
F˜(n) einx , (17)




f˜ (n) einθ , (18)
and


























2 f˜n − f˜n+1 − f˜n−1
)
(21)




f˜ (n) einθ . (23)
Comparing Eq. (21) and Eq. (23) we see that s can only have odd Fourier components.
The reality of s(θ) implies that s˜n = s˜∗−n while the symmetry implies s˜n = s˜−n ,





The first term in this expression is cos θ , in agreement with Eq. (34), the result of the
Cauchy distribution.
Because f (θ) is real and symmetric about 0, its Fourier coefficients are necessarily
real, showing that only cosine terms appear. Using Eqs. (14), (21) and (23), one obtains





(2k + 1)θ) ( f˜ (2k + 2) + f˜ (2k) − 2 f˜ (2k + 1))
2
(
f˜ (0) + 2∑k≥1 cos(2kθ) f˜ (2k)
) . (25)
Next I review the arguments in [1] but with a clearer statement of assumptions and
conclusions. The hypothesis that is refuted there is one that might reasonably come
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to mind. Given that large kicks would be difficult to explain and perhaps would have
been noticed, one might assume that the total kick that a given spin would be subject
to would be the sum of many small kicks.15 If those “small kicks” have a finite second
moment (and why shouldn’t they, if they’re small) then by the central limit theorem,
the total kick, whose probability distribution is f (θ) would be a Gaussian, f (θ) =
exp(−θ2/2μ2)√2πμ for some μ. From Eq. (16), f˜ (n) = (1/2π) exp(−n2μ2/2).







e−μ2/2 cosh((2k + 1)μ2) − 1
}
(
1 + 2∑k≥1 cos(2kθ)e−2k2μ2
) .
(26)
For μ = 0, s(θ) = 0, but the associated f is not an acceptable distribution and
the limit μ → 0 is singular. Consider small μ, going back to the distribution in θ .
Then g(θ) ≈ f (θ) since for small enough μ, the entire sum in g is dominated by
its first term. In this case Pr(UP) = f (θ)/[ f (θ) + f (θ + π)] For θ , say 30◦, this
gives a number very close to one, not cos2(15◦). On the other hand, for large μ, the
only surviving term in Eq. (26) is s = cos(θ)/2, which is certainly not small. At
intermediate values ofμ numerical methods for Eq. (26) are reliable and s can be seen
to differ significantly from zero.
The selection of the Cauchy distribution—even in preference to other long-tailed
distributions not possessing a second moment—can be seen in the following way.
One expects f to be very steeply peaked around 0, since most microscopic states do
nothing to the spins. So it is reasonable to take














taking care of the normalization.16 With this ansatz for f one can numerically compute
the terms in Eq. (14) and divide in order to arrive at s(θ). I have done this for a number
of  values both near 1 and near 1.5, where the latter is the minimum value for the
existence of a second moment. I first show various measures of the size of s(θ). In
Fig. 7 are shown 3 quantities for each  value. They are the maximum of |s(θ)|, its
mean and its standard deviation. In this logarithmic plot it is clear that  = 1, the
Cauchy distribution, is vastly superior to all the others. This assertion includes the
15 “Small kicks” would need to be separated by the physical correlation time in order to be considered
independent.
16 There is little loss of generality in using this form for f (θ). For all cases, we expect a to be small, so
that the tail of the distribution function has the correct properties. For  < 3/2 the asymptotic behavior in
θ is f ∼ 1/θ2 so that the only difference from the Lévy distribution is the small θ behavior. (For  = 1
this is precisely the Cauchy distribution.) For  ≥ 3/2 one can use the central limit theorem and one goes
back to the earlier discussion in the text. The only case not considered is large a and  ≥ 3/2. Numerical
investigation of this case found a minimum in size for s(θ) at a = 1, for a variety of  values. This minimum
was about e−4 in sharp contrast to the much smaller values for the Cauchy distribution using small a.
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Fig. 7 Size of the function s(θ) for various values of . The ordinate is the natural logarithm of various
measures of the size of s(θ). The value  = 1, the Cauchy distribution, clearly stands out as optimal. Three
measures are used, the maximum of |s(θ)| (as a function of θ ) and the mean and standard deviation of that
absolute value. I do not bother to put a detailed calculation of the neighborhood of  = 1.5 since the values
of all measures of s are even larger than those shown in this figure. (What is special about 1.5 is that that
is the threshold for the existence of a second moment. Thus for all values given in the above figure there is
no second moment. For the curves in this figure a = 0.01.
Fig. 8 Slow convergence of the analytically known infinite second moment. For a = 0.01, adding terms
for |x | < 1 already provides most of the probability. But it takes 104 terms for the second moment to even
reach 10.
neighborhood of  = 3/2 where the second moment begins to exist. Near  = 1.5 I
do not bother to show a graph since even the smallest measure of s’s size (the standard
deviation) has a (natural) logarithm of −3, in contrast to values near  = 1, where
values from −6 to −12 prevail.
It must be said that the numerical calculations performed here require considerable
care. The problem is the slow convergence of the sums involved. As an illustration
I first look at the second moment for the Cauchy distribution. This is analytically
known to be infinite. However, in Fig. 8 I show how the computed value of this
quantity grows as more and more terms are included. For a = 1/100 the integral of
the probability distribution is nearly unity when you include all terms for |x | ≤ 1.
However, at that point the value of the second moment is only about 0.003. Note that
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Fig. 9 Comparison of the numerically calculated s(θ) with the analytic value given in Eq. (34). The




k=−N f (θn + 2kπ),
for θn = −nθ such that n ∈ [−R/θ,+R/θ ]. For the three plots θ = 0.01, 0.0025, 0.0001,
N = 500, 2500, 5000 and R = 500, 1500, 1500. Note that despite the poor shape fit for the least accurate
calculation, the correct magnitude of s(θ) is obtained.
Fig. 10 A slight shift in  away
from its Cauchy distribution
value enlarges s(θ)
tremendously. Here I show a
graph of s for  = 1.01. To the
eye, the associated g is nearly
indistinguishable from its  = 1
value; nevertheless, s(θ) is
sensitive to this small change
and increases significantly over
its  = 1 value.
the graph of the second moment is logarithmic and it takes |x | ∼ 104 terms to even
bring the secondmoment over 10.Nevertheless, it does grow to infinity. Corresponding
issues affect the calculation of g(θ). Many consistency checks were therefore made
but even so one can see discrepancies. An example for the need of extreme accuracy
is shown in Fig. 9. There I compute s(θ) for  = 1 at three levels of numerical
precision. In the worst case, the range of θ was taken to be [−500, 500], the mesh
(the numerical “θ”) was 0.01 and the number of terms added to obtain g(θ) was
1000. The graph of g under these circumstances is not bad—nevertheless when used
to compute s and compared to the known analytic result (Eq. (34)) it is evidentally
poor. By contrast in the most accurate calculation that I performed the fit begins to
look good. In this case 10,000 terms were added in the computation of g, the mesh was
10−4 and the range was not 500, but 1500. Note though that despite the variation in
shape, for all three calculations, the magnitude of s(θ) was about the same, bounded
by 10−5. By contrast (Fig. 10), for the nearby  value, 1.01, the computed s(θ) is
dismal: not only is the shape wrong, but the magnitude scale is already significantly
larger.
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Appendix 3: Properties of the Cauchy Distribution.
The Cauchy distribution is
Ca(φ) = a/π
a2 + φ2 . (28)
It is a probability distribution having integral 1. It almost satisfies Eq. (5), and as such
is a form of cutoff distribution solving that equation. It is a Lévy distribution and has
many properties different from the standard normal (or Gaussian) distribution. In this
appendix I gather properties of this function.







z − nπ , (29)
where n runs over the integers. The poles of one over the tangent function occur at
multiples of π and the residues are unity. Let z = ψ + ib. Using elementary relations
I write the real and imaginary parts of Eq. (29),
tanψ




(ψ − nπ)2 + b2 , (30)
tanh b




(ψ − nπ)2 + b2 . (31)




Ca(θ + 2kπ) = 1
2π
tanh(a/2)
tanh2(a/2) cos2(θ/2) + sin2(θ/2) , (32)
where gC is the “g” associated with the Cauchy distribution. It follows that
gC (θ + π)
gC (θ)
= tanh
2(a/2) cos2(θ/2) + sin2(θ/2)
tanh2(a/2) sin2(θ/2) + cos2(θ/2)
= tanh
2(a/2) + tan2(θ/2)
tanh2(a/2) tan2(θ/2) + 1 . (33)
This obviously goes to the correct limit as a → 0 and just as obviously does not for
finite a. It is also possible to calculate the deviations from standard probabilities. The
probability of finding spin up is
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Pr(UP) = Prob. for special kicks UP
Prob. for all special kicks
= gC (θ)
gC (θ) + gC (θ + π)




This differs from the standard value, and in principle could be used to place a bound
on a. But this would not be an experimental test unless experiment showed a non-zero
value of a.











If one sums over the even components only (as in Eq. (23)), for the Cauchy distri-
bution these are simple:
∞∑
even n=−∞




exp(−2a|k| − ik2θ) = C2a(2θ). (36)
Integer Powers of the Cauchy Distribution
For reference and for the ability to make numerical checks, I study powers of the
Cauchy distribution. First the square:












dxx2C (2)a (x) = a2. (38)
Its Fourier coefficients are





dx exp(−ikx)C (2)a (x) =
1
2π
(a|k| + 1)e−a|k|. (39)
The third power is
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Its Fourier coefficients are





dx exp(−ikx)C (3)a (x) =
1
2π




Results of this subsectionwere used as analytic tests of numerical results.Asmentioned
in Sect. 2, convergence of many sums is extremely slow and numerical results must
be carefully checked. Although μ2 converges nicely for Eq. (37), μ4 does not, and
for the Fourier coefficients the analytic results provide bona fide checks of numerical
accuracy.
Appendix 4: A Statistical Measure that is not an Experimental Test
As discussed above, in (our version of17) the Stern-Gerlach experiment you send in a
beam of atoms prepared so that for all of them the spin degree of freedom has the wave




. At the end of the experiment—after the atoms have passed
through an appropriate non-uniform magnetic field—the spins are found to be either
spin-up (implying a wave function of the form (exp(iω), 0)† (ω real)) or spin-down.
The analysis considers “kicks” that align the spins “up” or “down,” and demands that
the underlying distribution of these kicks yield tan2(θ/2) as the ratio of down to up
spins. A distribution accomplishing this does not have a second moment, and would
be the Cauchy distribution with small parameter “a,” to wit
Ca(φ) = a/π
a2 + φ2 . (43)
Thedeviation from the standard (tan2) result isO(a2).Onemight propose the following
experimental test. Since the Cauchy distribution has such a long tail, i.e., drops off so
slowly in φ that it possesses no second moment, does not self-average, and possesses
other differences from the well behaved normal distribution, perhaps the counting
statistics in the Stern-Gerlach experiment will reflect this.
Let me be more specific. Consider the permissible outcomes of the Stern-Gerlach
experiment: The value of the angle of the kick, ω = −θ + φ, must either fall in the
17 To prepare the atoms in the state shown in Eq. (4) one could use half the output of another Stern-Gerlach
setup oriented at an appropriate angle. Something like this was done by Stern himself in the early 1930’s.
The problem he and his collaborators came up against was that if there was a non-zero magnetic field along
the entire path between the two magnets the spins would follow the field. Stern et al. summarized their work
in [15], but it is interesting to read their tribulations in the course of these efforts [16,17]. The analysis of
their work was done analytically by Majorana [18]. I have translated both the Frisch-Segre article (from
the German) and the Majorana article (from the Italian) (however, imperfectly) and would be happy to
send this to anyone who asks (and I’d be grateful for corrections). The Majorana calculation was a tour de
force and was sufficient to allow Frisch and Segre to conclude that theory and experiment were consistent.
It is amusing that in the 21st century I could use a computer to take into account effects that Majorana
neglected and found even better agreement of theory and experiment. My translations and computations
are unpublished.
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interval [−b/2, b/2] or [π−b/2, π+b/2] for small b. The probability of each outcome
can be evaluated and in fact gives the ratio tan2(θ/2). (So the Cauchy distribution
works.) If you send in N atoms, the average number of down spins will be sin2(θ/2)N
(and similarly for up), but the question is, are the deviations large?
The answer is “no,” as I now show. Let {k}, k = 1, . . . , N be independent iden-
tically distributed random variables having the Cauchy distribution. For given θ , the













− |φk + 2π − θ |
)
, (44)
with  the Heaviside function, φk the value taken by k , and  running over the
integers. For any one k the associated probability can be evaluated if one takes b
















This sum can be evaluated to yield
p = (b/2π) tanh(a/2)
sin2(θ/2) + cos2(θ/2) tanh2(a/2) . (46)
Now I want the probability that exactly n such random variables land in the given















with “True” the function that takes the value 1 when its argument is true, 0, oth-
erwise. As a function of n, the probability distribution in Eq. (47) is known to be
well-behaved, to have a second moment and similar good properties. The underlying
Cauchy distribution does not impair this distribution. The only trouble could arise
when θ is small compared to a, but the dependence on the value of a precludes an
experimental test of this behavior. (b too must be sufficiently small, but that is not a
problem.)
Note that in this demonstration I made essential use of the independence of the
“kicks.” The existence of correlations, as contemplated at the end of Sect. 4 would
invalidate this argument.
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